Greg Detre
24/1/01
Galen Strawson
what is it like to be a real materialist?
assume materialism is T
every event is physical (every concrete (not abstract) phenomenon/something/entity) (any kind of existence)
experience phenomena = real
qualitative character they have for those who have them as they have them
difficult to be a real materialist
unintelligible almost for experience phemomento to be matter � it seems mental on a par with extension + electricity
cows + mammals as if they are opposed categories
same with physical + mental � the distinction = bad habit of thought
different from �experience just is neurons firing� � agrees
agrees with Russell = neutral monist
matter = �ghostly�, �emanations of a locality� (1927)
intrinsic; structure vs qualities of matter in physics
Russell distinguishes between:
how X is structurally disposed
what X is [over + above] its structural disposition = �intrinsic� for Russell
= structure-transcendent or non-structural features
inverse square law � we know about abstract form, but not about the intrinsic nature of matter, says Russell
but Strawson says that�s too empirical � don't need to be so tied to our phenomenological concept of space
�spatiality of space� cannot be captured by �abstract dimensionality�
we do know something about the intrinsic nature of space
it�s so weird that the Cartesian matter/mind incommensurability is no longer justified
mutually repugnant - NO
eliminativism as the �great intellectual farce of our time�
consciousness as energy/field in space-time matter
we just don't know enough about matter
physics�s predicates all refer to publicly observable phenomena
they don't include experiential predicates
can't think of any testable ideas
metaphors of the play of energy
sceptical about Penrose as taking refuge in the mystery of consciousness/QM
hidden free will agenda
Henry is saying that there is nothing structure-transcendent
matter/experiential correlations still tell you nothing about the intrinsic nature of what�s going one
he�s better described as a realist � or perhaps even an idealist
Michael Lockwood � right-minded
space as God�s sensorium, perhaps
fuzzy selves � Joseph Priestly � materialist, Christian
dualism = shocking, maybe there�s a core little piece of matter that is the soul
Parfitian in response to swapping neurons with individual microchips
no different to atoms change in cell repair day-by-day
Johnson � refuted Berkeley by kicking a stone
mental is right in there with the causal explanation
doesn't follow, but is not inconsistent
terribly puzzling
part of the reason the brain is organised is to accommodate the mental at a deep level
sees neurophysiology as the best approach
but he�s pessimistic � no reason that we should be able to understand
McGinn � 2 modes of access to the brain, and they don't meet up
anti-Wittgenstein re privacy
what is �physical�???
radical eliminativism = mad = me???
how in line with Chalmers is he???
people criticise him because they ask what sort of enhanced understanding in the future might in any way help bridge the explanatory gap
panpsychist???
mentality as fundamental phenomenon???
how does PI arise out of matter???
epiphenomenalism fits with your account???
is Dennett an eliminativist??? y, according to Strawson
what happens after 5 mins? if it all goes wrong, doesn�t that indicate a missing piece
hasn't given any arg/reason for hope for materialist explanation of consciousness
2 people can share a minimally(???) identical experience if they had the experience befor ebeing tele-transporter-duplicated
the experience is in the past and they were then only 1 experience